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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CASE NO 16610

BETTY J. BLACK, individually
and as personal representative
of the estate of DON J. BLACK,
and DON J. BLACK REALTY, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by
the Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
entered in the above entitled matter on July 2, 1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, a Utah
corporation ("Utah Mortgage"), seeks a reversal of the Judgment
entered by the lower court pursuant to defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and reversal of the lower court's denial of
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Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Appellant

further seeks remand of this case to the Third Judicial
District Court for a full trial on the merits as to all
unresolved issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 26, 1975, Betty J. Black, Don J. Black
J. Black Realty, Inc.

and~

("Black Realty") executed and delivered

to Utah Mortgage their Trust Deed Note in the prinicipal

sum~

$675,715.00 evidencing a loan by appellant to the makers in
that amount.

(R. 2(,4), 9(,4) .)

Payment of the promissory

note was secured by a Trust Deed on certain real property
Black~

located in Salt Lake County, Utah, which Mr. and Mrs.
Black Realty were subdividing and developing.

(R. 16.)

The parties agreed that Utah Mortgage would release
individual lots within the proposed subdivision upon its
receipt of a pre-determined amount.

Initially, this amount wa

set at $5,200.00 but was subsequently raised to $5,500.00. ~.
26(,26), 29, 30.)

Typically, a buyer wishing to purchase o~

of the subdivision lots would pay the lot release price in~r
escrow with the title insurance company at closing.

The tit~

insurance company would then forward the release price to Ut~
Mortgage.

Upon receipt of the release price, Utah Mortgage

instructed the Trustee under the Trust Deed to execute a

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

partial release as to the particular lot.
division lots were released in this manner.

All of the sub(R. 30.)

once all

of the individual lots were released, a general Deed of
Reconveyance was recorded describing the entire tract.
(R.19.)
Because of various cost overruns, delays, and
unforeseen expenses, the amount required to complete the
project, and the corresponding funds disbursed from the loan
account exceeded the fair market value of the lots comprising
the project.

(R. 26

(,17).)

According to the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D. Anderson,
one of Utah Mortgage's loan officers, the unpaid principal
balance of the loan is $36,760.01.

(R. 25 (112).)

By a Complaint dated April 3, 1979, Utah Mortgage
instituted the present action against Betty J. Black, Black
Realty, and Betty J. Black as the personal representative of
the estate of Don J. Black who died prior to the filing of the
Complaint.

(R.

2-3.)

Defendants answered the complaint by alleging, inter
alia, that plaintiff's action was barred by the "one-action"
rule, § 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated, and by the doctrines of
estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and waiver.

(R. 10.)
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By a Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 19, 1979,
defendants moved the District Court for summary judgment bas~
upon the aforesaid one-action rule.

(R. 14-19.)

Correspon-

dingly, by Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
dated June 21, 1979, plaintiff sought partial summary judgment
as to the defenses raised in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Defenses of Defendants' Answer.

(R. 20.)

Si~·

By a Judgment dated

July 2, 1979, District Court Judge Christine M. Durham
defendants' Motion and denied that of plaintiff.

grant~

(R. 68-69.)

At the time of the hearing on the parties' Motions, counsel fu
both plaintiff and defendants orally stipulated that notwithstanding any language to the contrary in their respective
motions, both motions were to apply to all defendants.

(Id.)

ARGUMENT

POINT
I
---

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRl\NTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Although the lower court's Judgment does not specifY
the reasons why it granted defendants' Motion for Summary
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Judgment, the Motion itself, along with its accompanying
Memorandum, makes it clear that the basis of the court's ruling
was its finding that the "one-action rule", §78-37-1, Utah code
Ann.

(1953), barred plaintiff's action.

In pertinent part that

statute provides:
There can be one action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured
solely by mortgage upon real estate which action
must be in accordance with provisions of this
chapter . . • •
In ruling that the above statute prevented plaintiff from
seeking a judgment against the defendants on their promissory
note, the court appears to have held that the fact that Black
Realty and Mr. and Mrs. Black had agreed to release of the
mortgaged property was irrelevant.

The court also appears to

have rejected Utah Mortgage's argument that its recovery on the
promissory note could only be barred by the one-action rule if
it were negligent in releasing the collateral.

As more fully

discussed below, the court's apparent adverse ruling as to
these two issues was in error.

A. THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THEY AGREED TO RELEASE OF
THE COLLATERAL
As stated, the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D.
Anderson makes it clear that all three defendants agreed to the
lot release program under which Utah Mortgage released

-5-
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piecemeal-fashion all of the property described in the Trust
Deed.

Furthermore, the Trust Deed itself which was signed 0 ~ 1

by Black Realty provides, in part:
. 4. At any time and from time to time upon
written request of Beneficiary [Utah Mortgage],
payment of its fees and presentation of the Trust
Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full
reconveyance, for cancellation and retention),
without affecting the liability of any person for
the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee may . .
(d) reconvey without warranty,
all or any part of said property.
(R. 17.)
The effect of a debtor's consent to release of
collateral on the operation of the one-action rule has not beer
clearly defined by this court.

Indeed, in the five western

states which have adopted the one-action rule, Utah,
California, Idaho, Nevada and Montana, only the courts of
California appear to have considered this issue.

Thus, in

Cooper v. Burch, 3 Cal. 470, 86 P. 719 (1906), the California
Supreme Court held that where a co-signer on a promissory note
secured by a mortgage on real property was neither informed of
nor had consented to partial releases of the mortgaged
property, the holder of the note could not obtain personal
judgment against him on the note.
Conversely, in Mono Irrigation Company v. State, 32
Cal. 194, 162 P. 647

(1916) the court held that a creditor's

sale of personal property described in a chattel mortgage prio'

-6-
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to foreclosure as permitted in the mortgage instrument did not
bar the creditor from seeking personal judgment on the note for
any deficiency after the sale.

The court there said:

Thus, perhaps, if one having a debt secured by a
mortgage should cancel it of record, without the
consent of the mortgagor, it might be held he
could not bring a personal action. On the other
hand, if such mortgage were cancelled with the
consent or at the request of the mortgagor without
any intention of cancelling the indebtedness . • •
the holder of the indebtedness would not be at all
prevented by [the one-action rule) from bringing
and maintaining a personal action for the amount
due. Id. at 648-649.
The rule in Utah appears to be consistent with that of
California.

Thus, in Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P.

779 (1897), this court said:
(W]hen the mortgagee by his own act or neglect
deprives himself of the rights to foreclose the
mortgage, he at the same time deprives himself of
the right to an action on the note. Ee is not
permitted, without the consent of the mortgagor,
to release the mortgage for the purpose of
bringing an action upon the note. 15 Utah at 241,
49 P. at 781.
(Emphasis added).
In view of the fact that prior to the advent of the
Uniform commercial Code the one-action rule applied both to
real and personal property, perhaps the clearest statement of
Utah law as to the effect of a consent to release of collateral
securing payment of the note is found in §70A-3-606(1), Utah
Code Ann.

( 19 53) , which provides:
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The holder discharges any party to the instrument
to the extent that without such party's consent
the holder

(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the
instrument given by or on behalf of the party or
any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, analogous common-law doctrines in

guaran~

and surety law also point to the conclusion that in agreeing tc
release of the mortgage property, the makers of a promissory
note lose the protection of the one-action rule in the event of
a subsequent action on the note.

Thus, concerning the effect

of release of security as to a guarantor, it has been stated:
Where the creditor, having had other security for
payment of the debtor's obligation, releases or
diverts that security, the guarantor is generally
discharged to the extent of the value of the
collateral released or diverted . . • . There are,
however, exceptions to the general rule stated
above.
If the guarantor consented to the
discharge of the security, he is not released. 38
Arn. Jur.2d Guaranty §84.
Similarly, it is well-established that release of
security by a secured creditor acts as a prorata discharge of
surety unless he consented to the release.

Chicago Bridge ~

Iron Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 46 Ill.2d 522, 264 N.E.~
134, 136 (1970); Walin v. Young, 181 Ore. 185, 180 P.2d 535,
537

(1947).

-8-
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1

Finally, defendants' consent to release of the
collateral acts as a waiver of their defense under the
one-action rule.

As to the doctrine of waiver this court has

said
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must
be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquis~ it.
It must be distinctly made,
although it may be expressed or implied. Phoenix
Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d
308, 311-312 (1936); American Savings & Loan
Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445
P.2d 1, 3 (1968).
It will be seen that the elements of waiver described
in the above decision are present here.

The Blacks and Black

Realty intentionally relinquished their right to prevent
release of the collateral.
was distinctly made.

Their relinquishment of this right

Thus they cannot now be heard to disclaim

the negative effects of their agreement.
It should be remembered that all of the loan proceeds
were used for the benefit of the defendants.

Similarly, the

proceeds from the sale of the individual lots were used to
reduce the indebtedness owed to Utah Mortgage.

Mr. and Mrs.

Black and Black Realty agreed to the lot release program which
ultimately resulted in release of the security.

Under such

circumstances it would be both inequitable and contrary to
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well-established principles of law to prevent Utah Mortgage
from recovering the unpaid balance of the loan from the
defendants.
B. THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS SINCE RELEASE OF THE COLLATERAL WA
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLECT OR FAULT
Quite apart from the fact that in consenting to the
release of the collateral defendants have waived any objectioo
they might otherwise have had to the lot release program, it
must also be recognized that Utah Mortgage's behavior was

fr~

of the neglect or fault which has led courts to prevent
recovery by a secured creditor where the collateral has been
lost.
Judicial interpretation of the one-action rule has
made it clear that the rule requires exhaustion of the
collateral before resort can be had against the maker of a
secured note.

Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No.

1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936).
However, the courts do not require a meaningless foreclosure
action where the collateral has been previously lost or
exhausted.

Id.

By contrast, if loss of the collateral is

attributable to the culpable act of the secured party, the
courts have refused to permit the creditor to recover any
deficiency from the debtor.
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The type of culpability necessary to bar a creaitor's
recovery has not been clearly defined by the courts.

In

Donaldson v. Grant, supra, the court found that the failure of
the assignee of the secured creditor to file timely notice of
the assignment of a mortgage, thereby losing the priority of
his lien, barred him from recovering a personal judgment
against a co-maker.

In ruling against the secured party, the

court quoted with approval the following language from the
California case of Merced Security Savings Bank v. Casaccia,
103 Cal. 641, 37 P. 648 (1894):
[T]he obvious purpose of the statute [i.e., the
California one-action rule] is to compel one who
has taken a specific lien to secure his debt to
exhaust his security before having recourse to the
general assets of the debtor. When he has done
this, or when, without his fault, the security has
been lost, the policy of the law does not prohibit
a personal action.
15 Utah at 241, 49 P. at 781.
(Emphasis added.)
The court also quotes with approval a second California case,
Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42
P. 447, 448

(1895) wherein the court stated:

But, when the mortgagee by his own act or
neglect deprives himself of the right to foreclose
the mortgage, he at the same time deprives himself
of the right to an action on the note. Id.
Whatever confusion may have been created by the "act
or neglect" test of Donaldson v. Grant, ~, was eliminated
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in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan Lodge, supra, where the court
characterized Donaldson v. Grant as requiring fault.

But it has also been held that, where the security
has be~n lost throu~h n~ fault of the mortgagee, ·
an action may be ma1nta1ned directly upon the
personal obligation evidenced by the note without
going through the idle and fruitless procedure of
foreclosure.
Id. at 1049.
(Emphasis added).
As if to further emphasize the requirement of neglect
or fault, the court in Cache Valley Banking further stated:
He [the secured party] has not waived nor lost •
[the security] by his negligence.
It was lost
by the fault of the mortgagor in not paying the
first mortgage.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, this court has described the type of behavior o:
a secured creditor sufficient to bar his recovery of a persooi
judgment in terms of "fault"

(Cache Valley Banking v. Logan

Lodge, Donaldson v. Grant) and "act or neglect"
Grant).

(Donaldson v.

The question posed by the case at bar is whether the

act of Utah Mortgage in instructing the Trustee under the TrITT!
Deed to reconvey individual lots in accordance with its
agreement with the defendants was the type of "fault" or "act
or neglect" which should bar it from obtaining a personal
judgment against the defendants.
At the outset it must be recognized that the word
"act" in the Donaldson v. Grant test of "act or neglect" does
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not refer to every conceivable affirmative act of the creditor
in releasing the collateral, but rather incorporates the
concepts of neglect and fault.
That not every act contributing to the release of
collateral is subsumed within the expression "act" as used by
the court in Donaldson v. Grant becomes clear when one examines
the factual circumstances involved in the relevant Utah cases.
Thus, in Donaldson v. Grant, the creditor was barred from
recovery where he lost the priority of his lien by virtue of
having neglected to record the notice of the assignment of the
mortgage to himself.

By contrast, in Cache Valley Banking Co.

v. Logan Lodge, supra, the creditor was not barred from
recovery where the earlier foreclosure of a prior mortgage had
resulted in exhaustion of the collateral, nothwithstanding the
fact that the creditor could have commenced his own foreclosure
action prior to that of the first mortgage holder.
The two cases illustrate the positive and negative
aspects of the rule that the "act" of the creditor must contain
the element of fault or neglect.

Both involve an act (actually

an omission) which resulted in loss of collateral.

But only

the "act" which was of a negligent character barred recovery on
the note.

Thus the court in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan

Lodge explained that the creditor's lack of negligence, rather
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than its failure to act, was the factor upon which the court
relied in ruling in his favor.

As noted above, the "act or neglect" test adopted in
Donaldson v. Grant was actually taken from a California
decision of Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. Thornton,
supra.

California is also the state from whom Utah adopted

one-action statute.

It is therefore interesting to note that

the California rule requires the element of fault.
If a mortgagee cancels a mortgage of record
without the mortgagor's consent he cannot then sue
on the note on the loan as he would be permitted
to do had the security become lost or valueless.
On the other hand, a simple action on the note or
debt is permissable where it appears that the
security has, without fault of the ~ortgagee, been
lost to him . • • 34 Cal. Jur.2d Mortgages §437,
at 109.
This formulation is virtually identical to that
adopted in Idaho, Montana and Nevada. See Rein v. Callaway,
Idaho 634, 65 P. 63, 64 (1901); Vande Veegaete v. Vande
Veegaete, 75 Mont. 52, 243 P. 1082, 1084 (1928); McMillan v.
United Mortgage Co., 82 Nev. 117, 412 P.2d 604, 606

(1966).

It should be further noted that the rule barring
recovery by a secured creditor whose own negligence or fault

has resulted in loss of the collateral is nothing more than t

negative formulation of the Uniform Commercial Code's requirE

ment that a secured creditor exercise "reasonable care" as tc
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collateral.

§70A-9-207(1), Utah Cooe Ann.

(1953).

It is also

closely analogous to the common law's imposition of a duty of
"ordinary care" in cases not coming within the Code.

First

National Bank Giddings v. Helwig, 464 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.
App. 1971).
In the instant case, it is clear that Utah Mortgage's
actions in releasing the collateral were free of fault and
neglect and that Utah Mortgage acted with reasonable care.
These actions may be summarized as follows:

(1) Utah Mortgage

agreed with the defendants that it would release individual
lots upon payment of a pre-determined amount (R. 26, 29)7 and
(2) upon receipt of the release price, Utah Mortgage instructed
the Trustee to execute a Deed of Reconveyance as to the
particular lot.

(R. 30.)

To say that Utah Mortgage acted unreasonably or in a
negligent manner in entering into the agreement with the
defendants for partial releases of the collateral, is to admit
at the same time that the defendants were themselves negligent
in so agreeing.

The more logical conclusion, however, is that

plaintiff and defendants were acting in a reasonable manner at
the time they entered into the agreement and that only in light

of subsequent events can it be seen that the lot release price
should have been set at a slightly higher level.

In any case,
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it is clear that the defendants were not precluded by the
agreement from reducing the principal amount of the note by
means of payments from their share of the purchase price of lli
lots or from other sources.
As to the reasonableness of Utah Mortgage's release [
the individual lots upon receipt of the release price, it ne~
only be observed that had Utah Mortgage refused to make such
releases it would have thereby breached its agreement with
defendants.

Thus, if Utah Mortgage were negligent or acted

unreasonably, it must be concluded that it is negligent or
unreasonable to perform one's covenants under a contract.
Furthermore, the fact that the total indebtedness of over
$675,000 was reduced to less than $40,000 through the lot
release program would appear to refute any allegation that lot'
were negligently released.
In conclusion, it should be observed that permitting
Utah Mortgage's recovery would not violate the policy underlying the one action rule.

The policy of the rule has been

expressed as follows:
The purpose of the statute is dual. One is to
protect the mortgagor against multiplicity of
actions when the separate actions, though
theoretically distinct, are closely connected that
normally they can and should be decided in one
suit.
The other is to compel a creditor who has
taken a mortgage on land to exhaust his security
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before attempting to reach any unmortgaged
property to satisfy his claim. G. Osborne,
Mortgages §334, at 700-701 (2d ed. 1970).
In this case the policy against multiplicity of
actions is not violated by this action since the release of the
collateral precludes any possibility of a separate foreclosure
action.

Correspondingly, the policy requiring resort to the

collateral before any personal judgment can be sought would not
be violated since the property has already been sold and the
proceeds therefrom either distributed to the defendants or
applied against the defendants indebtedness.

It follows that

the one-action rule does not bar this action.

POINT II
THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
AGAINST MR. AND MRS. BLACK BECAUSE THEY WERE SURETIES
As noted above, the practical effect of the one-action
rule is to require the creditor to exhaust the collateral as a
prerequisite to any recovery directly from the debtor.
However, the rule has no application to those who sign or
indorse a note as sureties.

Thus it has been stated:

The Code requirement that there be but one form of
action for recovery of. any debt or enforcement of
any rights secured by a mortgage app~ies to ~he
primary debtor and was enacted for his benefit.
The law never contemplated that because one has
taken a mortgage he cannot take other independant
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security for his debt and, if the contract for
such security permits it, enforce such contract
without reference to the mortgage debt.
34 Cal.
Jur.2d Mortgages §429, at 98-99.
Where, as here, some of the co-makers on a note are
nothing more than sureties, the one-action rule does not
require foreclosure on the mortgage securing payment of the
note as a prerequisite to a personal action against the
accommodation makers.
[U)less there is some agreement or soecial
circumstance imposing deligence on the creditor as
a duty, he aoes not by mere failure to pursue the
original debtor discharge a guarantor, surety, or
indorser, though his passivity in this regard may
result in barring his remedy against the original
debtor.
Accordingly, a creditor loses no rights
against an indorser, whose liability has become
fixed by a simple failure to enforce his lien
against property mortgaged to secure the debt.
Id. at 100.
The reason for the above rule is clear:

one who hu

given security for the payment of a debt may reasonably expect
that the creditor will look first to the security for satisf~
tion of the indebtedness.

By contrast, one whose obligation i:

secured by collateral belonging to a co-debtor is not injured
if the creditor chooses to proceed against him directly instN
of resorting first to the collateral.
In addition, the undertaking of the surety is in the
nature of additional collateral to the obligation of the

-13-
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primary maker.

If he defaults, the creditor may choose to

waive the collateral and proceed directly against the surety on
his separate contract of suretyship.

Thus as to a suretyship

in the form of a guaranty it has been held that a creditor may
proceed directly against an absolute guarantor without first
resorting to foreclosure of a mortgage or trust deed, even
where the one action rule is in effect.

First National Bank of

Nevada v. Barengo, 91 Nev. 396, 536 P.2d 487 (1975); Coombs v.
Heers, 366 F. Supp. 851 (D. C. Nev. 1973).
"Suretyship" is defined by the Restatement as
follows:
Suretyship is the relation which exists where one
person has undertaken an obligation and another
person is also under an obligation or other duty
to the oblige, who is entitled to but one
performance, and as between the two who are bound,
one rather than the other should perform.
Restatement of Security §82 (1941)
The co-maker of a note may be a surety.

Miller v.

Zeigler, 3 Utah 17, 5 P. 518 (1881).
In the case at bar it is undisputed that Mr. and Mrs.
Black and Black Realty signed the note.

It is also apparent

from the Trust Deed (R. 16) and the Deed of Reconveyance (R.

19) that Black Realty was the fee owner of the mortgaged
property.

Thus Mr. and Mrs. Black appear to have signed the

note as sureties for the obligation of Black Realty.

-19Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Correspondingly under the California rule described above, Mr,.
Black, both individually and as executrix for her husband's
estate has no standing to complain that the collateral which
was supplied by her co-defendant, Black Realty, was negligenu
disposed of.

It follows that the one-action rule should not~

so construed as to bar Utah Mortgage's action against the
Blacks, even if this Court were to decide that the action
against Black Realty is precluded.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Consistent with its grant of summary judgment to
defendants, the lower court denied Utah Mortgage's Motion fur
Partial Summary Judgment as to the defenses of the one-action
rule (Third Defense), estoppel (Fourth Defense), accord and
satisfaction (Fifth Defense) and waiver (Sixth Defense).
Since, as discussed above, the court ruled incorrectly when it
granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon tie
one-action rule, it follows that this court should reverse n~
only the lower court's granting of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, but also its denial of Plaintiff's Motion fo·
Partial Summary Judgment on the same issue.

In addition, sine'
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the facts as set forth in the various affidavits are uncontradieted as to the doctrines of estoppel, accord and satisfaction
and waiver, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as
to these issues should have been granted and failure to so rule
was reversible error on the part of the lower court.
A.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ITS

CLAIM.
Defendants assert in their Fourth Defense that
plaintiff is "barred, precluded, and estopped by the terms of
its Deed of Reconveyance .

from asserting the claims and

demands set forth herein."

An examination of the facts in this

case in light of the elements of estoppel as enunciated by the
Utah Supreme Court shows clearly that defendants' assertion is
without merit.
The Utah Supreme Court has described equitable
estoppel in the following terms:
It is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party
from deluding or inducing another into a position
where he will unjustly suffer loss. As applicable
here, the test is whether there is conduct, by act
or omission, by which one party knowingly leads
another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take
such course of action, which will result in his
detriment or damage if the first party is
permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct or
representation.
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 903,
905 (Utah 1975).
See also, 28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35.
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In the case at bar the only conduct which defendants
point to as giving rise to estoppel is plaintiff's reconveyaITT
of the real property described in the Trust Deed which
originally secured the promissory note sued upon.

There has

been no allegation made by defendants that plaintiff is
attempting to "repudiate or deny his conduct or representation."

Id.

Similarly, defendants have not alleged that as a

result of plaintiff's releasing of its lien they have taken
some course of action resulting in detriment or damage to
them.

Indeed, the only evidence before this court is that

defendants specifically agreed to release of the collateral.
Thus, there could not have been any detrimental reliance
part of defendants giving rise to estoppel.

on~

Defendants'

invocation of the doctrine of estoppel must therefore be
rejected.
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION.
Defendants claim in their Fifth Defense that Utah
Mortgage's claim is barred by the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction.
assertion.

An examination of the authorities belies this

The doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been

described by the Utah Supreme Court in the following
terminology:
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An accord and satisfaction is a method of
discharging a contract, or settling a claim
arising from a contract, by substituting for such
contract or claim an agreement for the satisfaction thereof, and the execution of the
substituted agreement.
"To constitute an accord
and satisfaction there must be an offer in full
satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied by
such acts and declarations as amount to a
condition that if it is accepted, it is to be in
full satisfaction, and the condition must be such
that the party to whom the offer is made is bound
to understand that if he accepts it, he does so
subject to the conditions imposed.
. • • The
accord is the agreement and the satisfaction is
the execution or performance of such agreement •
• . •Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977) (Quoting 1 Arn.
Jur.2d Accord and Satisfaction §1.)
As shown by the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson,

(R.26

(•Bl.) Utah Mortgage has never agreed to substitution of the
promissory note sued upon for any other obligation.

Similarly,

defendants have adduced no evidence to show that they ever made
an offer "in full satisfaction of the obligation".
Stevens School, supra.

Cannon v.

It is true that the Affidavit of Craig

D. Anderson shows that there was a partial reduction of the
indebtedness each time a subdivision lot was sold.
(•9) .)

(R.26

However, as Mr. Anderson's Affidavit also shows, the

proceeds from the sale of the lots never completely paid off
the underlying indebtedness.

Thus, there was only an "accord

and satisfaction" to the extent of the proceeds from the sales
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of the lots.

Correspondingly, defendants'

theory is without

merit.
C.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY WAIVER.

Defendants assert in their Sixth Defense that "plai~
tiff is barred and precluded hy waiver from asserting the
claims and demands set forth herein."

As is the case with thE

other theories discussed above, defendants'

theory of waiver i

not consistent with the law of this state.
As noted above, this Court has defined waiver as an
intentional relinquishment of a known right.
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right.
To constitute a waiver, there must
be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it.
It must be distinctly made,
although it may be expressed or implied.
Phoenix
I~surance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d
308, 311-312 (1936); American Savings & Loan
Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289 292, 445
P.2d 1, 3 (1968).
As the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson makes clear,
Utah Mortgage has never agreed to relinquish or dispense with
its rights under the promissory note.

(R.

26-27

(1111).)

Thus

there is no factual support for defendants' waiver theorv.
The defe?nses of estoppel, accord and satisfaction, an:
waiver are all affirmative defenses the burden of proof of
which rests upon defendants.
Jur.2d Evidence §129.

Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c);

29 Am.

In the case at bar defendants have
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failed to produce any evidence in support of the aforesaid
theories; on the contrary plaintiff has produced affidavits in
support of its Summary Judgment negating those defenses.

It

follows that plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as
to the issues of estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and waiver
should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
Although the defenses relied upon by defendants may be
described variously in legal terminology as the "one-action
rule", "estoppel and waiver" and "accord and satisfaction" they
are all essentially variations on a central theme: namely, that
plaintiff should not be entitled to recover against defendants
since the loan collateral was insufficient to pay off the
indebtedness.

As demonstrated above, the legal authorities do

not support defendants in this argument.

In essence, what

defendants are saying is that any loss on the project should be
absorbed by Utah Mortgage, but that any profit should inure to
them.

While such an arrangement may be typical of a partner-

ship or joint venture, it is certainly anomalous to the
relationship of a lender to a borrower.

Defendants gambled on
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the real estate market and lost.

Now they should be requir~

to reimburse the lender who made their venture possible.
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